BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel Releases Report

HOUSTON, Jan. 16 /PRNewswire/ -- The BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel on Tuesday released its report with the panel's findings and recommendations.

The report includes specific and extensive recommendations to improve BP's corporate safety oversight, corporate safety culture, and corporate and site process safety management systems relating to its five U.S. refineries.

The panel based its recommendations on more than 30 findings, including a finding that BP has material process safety deficiencies at all five of its U.S. refineries. The panel also found that significant process safety culture issues exist at each refinery, not just the Texas City facility that experienced a tragic explosion in March 2005.

Although BP aspires to be a safe company, it has not provided effective process safety leadership in making certain its management and U.S. refining workforce understand what is expected of them regarding process safety performance, the panel found.

The findings and recommendations are included in a 300+ page report that the panel has delivered to BP's Group Chief Executive John Browne. The report is available on BP's website at http://www.bp.com/bakerpanelreport .

"If BP dedicates itself to implementing the panel's recommendations, we believe BP U.S. refineries can significantly improve their process safety performance," said panel chairman James A. Baker, III, the 61st U.S. Secretary of State.

"We are under no illusion that the deficiencies we have identified are unique to BP," Baker said. "If other refining and chemical companies consider our recommendations and apply them, we believe that those workplaces will be safer and that future tragedies like the Texas City accident can be avoided."

BP created the panel in October 2005 following an urgent recommendation to do so issued by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board in the aftermath of the accident at Texas City. As called for by the urgent recommendation, BP established a panel that has a diverse makeup and included outside safety experts from different fields and from high-risk sectors.

In its report, the panel maintains a central theme that prior to the Texas City tragedy, BP emphasized personal safety and had achieved significant improvement in personal injury rates.

But the company did not emphasize process safety. BP mistakenly interpreted improving personal injury rates as an indication of acceptable process safety performance at its U.S. refineries.

BP's reliance on this data, combined with an inadequate process safety understanding, created a false sense of confidence that BP was properly addressing process safety risks.

Since the BP refinery accident at Texas City, the panel believes that BP has expressed a major commitment to a better process safety regime, has committed significant resources and personnel to that end, and has undertaken or announced many measures that could beneficially impact safety at BP's U.S. refineries.

The panel also noted improved efforts of executive management to emphasize BP's commitment to safety and steps undertaken to implement lessons learned from the Texas City tragedy.

The panel noted that whether measures undertaken or announced will be effective remains to be seen and that the ultimate effectiveness and sustainability of intended improvements to its process safety performance can be determined only over time.

The panel made specific and extensive recommendations in 10 areas, including specific guidance to BP for implementation of the recommendations. One recommendation calls for BP to engage an independent monitor for five years to report annually to BP's board of directors on the company's progress in implementing the panel's recommendations.

Baker said that BP can become an industry leader in process safety by following all of the panel's recommendations.

"Doing that will take a concerted and lasting effort," Baker said. "It will not be easy. The panel believes, however that the BP refining workforce is ready, willing, and able to participate in a sustained, corporate-wide effort to move BP towards excellence in process safety performance as called for in our report."

  The panel's recommendations are summarized briefly below:
   1)   The Board of Directors of BP, BP's executive management (including
        its Group Chief Executive), and other members of BP's corporate
        management must provide effective leadership on process safety.
        Those individuals must demonstrate their commitment to process
        safety by articulating a clear message on the importance of process
        safety and matching that message both with the policies they adopt
        and the actions they take.
   2)   BP should establish and implement an integrated and comprehensive
        process safety management system that systematically and
        continuously identifies, reduces, and manages process safety risks
        at its U.S. refineries.
   3)   BP should develop and implement a system to ensure that its
        executive management, its refining line management above the
        refinery level, and all U.S. refining personnel, including managers,
        supervisors, workers, and contractors, possess an appropriate level
        of process safety knowledge and expertise.
   4)   BP should involve the relevant stakeholders to develop a positive,
        trusting, and open process safety culture within each U.S. refinery.
   5)   BP should clearly define expectations and strengthen accountability
        for process safety performance at all levels in executive management
        and in the refining managerial and supervisory reporting line.
   6)   BP should provide more effective and better coordinated process
        safety support for the U.S. refining line organization.
   7)   BP should develop, implement, maintain, and periodically update an
        integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators for
        more effectively monitoring the process safety performance of the
        U.S. refineries.  In addition, BP should work with the U.S. Chemical
        Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and with industry, labor
        organizations, other governmental agencies, and other organizations
        to develop a consensus set of leading and lagging indicators for
        process safety performance for use in the refining and chemical
        processing industries.
   8)   BP should establish and implement an effective system to audit
        process safety performance at its U.S. refineries.
   9)   BP's Board should monitor the implementation of the recommendations
        of the panel (including the related commentary) and the ongoing
        process safety performance of BP's U.S. refineries.  The Board
        should, for a period of at least five calendar years, engage an
        independent monitor to report annually to the Board on BP's progress
        in implementing the panel's recommendations (including the related
        commentary).  The Board should also report publicly on the progress
        of such implementation and on BP's ongoing process safety
        performance.
   10)  BP should use the lessons learned from the Texas City tragedy and
        from the panel's report to transform the company into a recognized
        industry leader in process safety management.

The report notes that the panel was not charged to conduct an investigation into the causes of the tragic accident at Texas City in March 2005 and did not seek to affix blame or apportion responsibility for that accident.

  Among other things, the panel found that:
   *  BP has not provided effective process safety leadership and that the
      lack of leadership touches all levels of BP's corporate management.
   *  BP has not adequately established process safety as a core value
      across all its five U.S. refineries.
   *  BP has emphasized personal safety in recent years and has achieved
      significant improvement in personal safety performance, but BP did not
      emphasize process safety.
   *  Each of the U.S. refineries has its own separate and distinct process
      safety culture.  While some refineries are far more effective than
      others in promoting process safety, significant process safety culture
      issues exist at each of BP's five U.S. refineries, not just Texas
      City.
   *  Instances of a lack of operating discipline, toleration of serious
      deviations from safe operating practices, and apparent complacency
      toward serious process safety risks existed at each of the U.S.
      refineries.
   *  BP did not effectively incorporate process safety in management
      decision-making.  BP tended to have a short-term focus in its U.S.
      refining operations, and its decentralized management system and
      entrepreneurial culture delegated substantial discretion to U.S.
      refinery plant managers without clearly defining process safety
      expectations, responsibilities, or accountabilities.
   *  BP has not implemented an integrated, comprehensive, and effective
      process safety management system for its U.S. refineries.
   *  BP had deficiencies in how it measured process safety performance, its
      incident and near miss investigation system, its process safety audit
      system, and how it ensured that identified process safety deficiencies
      were addressed promptly and tracked to correction.